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 WHY BLU-RAY VS. HD-DVD IS NOT VHS VS. BETAMAX: 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF STANDARD-SETTING CONSORTIA 
 
Julian P. Christ ‡ and André P. Slowak §  
 
Extensive research has been conducted on the economics of standards in the last three decades. 
To date, standard-setting studies emphasize a superior role of demand-side-driven technology 
diffusion; these contributions assume the evolution of a user-driven momentum and network 
externalities. We find that consumers wait for a dominant standard if they are unable to evaluate 
technological supremacy. Thus, supply-side-driven activities necessarily need to address an 
absence of demand-side technology adoption. 
Our paper focuses on Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD as an illustrative case of consortia standard wars. 
One central role of consortia is to coordinate strategic behavior between heterogeneous agents, 
e.g. incumbents, complementors (content providers) and others, but also to form a coalition 
against other standard candidates. More precisely, we argue that agents signal standard-setting 
war outcomes through consortia events. We depict the essential role of consortia structures for 
the recently determined standard war between the High-Definition disc specifications Blu-ray 
and HD-DVD. Therefore, the paper suggests that unique supply-side dynamics from consortia 
structures, consortia announcements and exclusive backing decisions of firms determined the 
standard-setting process in the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war. 
This study is based on the following data: movie releases and sales numbers, membership 
affiliation for structural consortia analysis, and an in-depth event study. A detailed comparison 
of the technological specifications of both standard specifications supports our argument that 
there was no technological supremacy of one standard candidate from a consumer-oriented use-
case perspective. We furthermore clarify that content providers (complementors) such as movie 
studios and movie rental services feature a gate-keeping position in the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD 
standard war. In the case of Blu-ray, film studios decided the standard war because the 
availability of movie releases, but not technological supremacy, made the standard attractive to 
consumers. 
Finally, we find that there is a co-evolution of the consortia in terms of membership dynamics. 
Particularly, firm allegiance of heterogeneous agents plays a crucial role. 
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1 Introduction 
Several studies on standard diffusion in consumer technologies have been conducted in the last 
three decades, for instance, VHS vs. BETAMAX (Arthur, 1990; Arthur, 1997; Liebowitz and 
Margolis, 1995; Park, 2004), DVD-RW vs. DVD+RW/DVD-RAM (Gauch, 2008; van 
Wegberg, 2004), and DIVX vs. DVD (Dranove and Gandal, 2003). Blu-ray and HD-DVD 
represent standard candidates developed to replace the 1995 DVD-standard. Blu-ray (Blu-ray 
Disc Association) was initiated by Sony. HD-DVD (HD-DVD Promotion Group) was 
originally developed by Toshiba and NEC; the HD-DVD specification was then approved by 
the DVD Forum.1 The two formats increase storage capacity so that a disc can store an entire 
film at HDTV resolution. High definition television (HDTV) increases the maximal 16:9-screen 
resolution up to 720p, 1080i or 1080p (‘p’ for progressive, not interlaced resolution), which 
supports large plasma displays and LCD screens. For comparison, the existing DVD standard is 
limited to 480p (DVD Enhanced Definition format) and is thus not sufficient for recent 
technological developments in consumer electronics. Until today, HDTV mainly dominates the 
Japanese and US market; in some countries of Asia and in Europe it is rather in an early 
diffusion stage.  
Shapiro and Varian (1999, p. 8) describe a standard war as a “battle for market dominance 
between incompatible technologies.” Suarez (2004) points out that there are different life-cycle 
stages in standard wars. Such wars take place between firms; e.g., Microsoft against Netscape on 
internet browsers (Windrum, 2004), or Matsushita against Sony on VHS vs. Betamax (Park, 
2004). It may be a battle of single technologies, but also a battle of product systems (Shapiro 
and Varian, 1999). Furthermore, there is a well established body of literature on path 
dependency and technological lock-in by historical events (increasing returns, positive 
feedbacks, and ergodic systems; particularly cf. Arthur, 1989, 1990). Farrell and Saloner (1985) 
discuss lock-ins related to technology life-cycle. Markets with network effects and thus positive 
returns (Katz and Shapiro, 1986, 1992; Shy, 1996; van Wegberg, 2004) are characterized by 
path-dependent processes of technology adoption; these authors also address the means of 
compatibility for the consumer. Furthermore, Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) argue that not only 
a superior technology, but also inefficient technologies may become a standard. Although most 
studies on standard-setting processes are empirically based on information and consumer 
technologies such as internet technologies or mobile phone technology (e.g., Funk, 2009; Funk 
and Methe, 2001; Andriew, 2008; de Vries et al., 2008; or Leiponen, 2008), contemporary 
research also looks at standard-setting processes in more traditional industries (e.g., Gerybadze, 
2008; Gerybadze and Slowak, 2008; Schweikle, 2009). Standards within this paper shall be 
defined as the specification of technology with the purpose of integrating knowledge into 
products. Standardization shall describe the outcome of that standard-setting process, that is, 
dominant design within the industry or unification of different technological approaches 
between co-operating agents. 
More recently, some studies have shed light on the arrangement of agents who are involved in a 
particular standard war. For instance, Economides and Skrzypacz (2003) argue for a two-stage 
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game: firms bargain to form consortia (‘coalitions’) until equilibrium is reached and until the 
final division of surplus is specified.2  Contemporary innovation studies provide evidence for a 
rising number of collaborations among firms, e.g. research and development alliances, standard-
setting consortia or other kinds of inter-firm co-operation. Nonetheless, there is little research 
on how consortia’s collaborative behavior is unfold and how the activities of one consortium in 
standard wars shape or are related to the activities of competing and complementary consortia. 
Our in depth case study on Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD demonstrates how recent standard wars occur 
between coalitions, respectively consortia, rather than between single firms, and what drives 
consortia dynamics. Standard wars today are underpinned by evolutional structural dynamics 
and events which (re)shape the value of standard technology in the course of time. 
Furthermore, we show that the interplay between complementors (content providers) and 
incumbents drives supply-side standard-setting dynamics. In our view, the supply-side is 
characterized by a population of generally competing, only temporally co-operating consortia. 
The demand-side is characterized by waiting consumers; more precisely, we assume that a ‘sit-
and-wait-strategy’ is optimal in the face of technological non-supremacy and incompatibility of 
both standard candidates. Note that technological non-supremacy is paired with uncertainty 
about demand-side network effects. We conceptualize co-evolution among consortia as 
competition for limited assets, strategic positions, and crucial market access (e.g. movie studios, 
video game industry), where we find intra-system cooperation and inter-system aggression (for a 
formalized model see Albornoz and Parravano, 2009). In this respect, we analyze activities of 
firms/consortia in historical time and assume that agents exploit their experience from past 
standard wars. 
Given that contemporary standard wars take place between consortia and not between single 
firms, the paper addresses the issue whether recent standard wars (in consumer electronics) are 
decided by technological supremacy, which would then lead to a quick adoption rate by 
consumers. If not, we ask what kinds of mechanisms and events essentially determine 
technology adoption.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter two gives a brief literature survey on standard 
wars and technology adoption, including an overview on consortia literature related to standard-
setting. Moreover, we conceptualize the structure of a typical standard-setting consortium in 
consumer electronics. Chapter three then highlights the peculiarities of the recently determined 
Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war by means of market share analysis, in-depth analysis of 
technological specifications and the structure of both HD-consortia. Chapter four then 
introduces our analysis of consortia dynamics, crucial announcements and firm or consortia 
decisions that seem to be important for a detailed understanding of the case; it also provides a 
social network illustration and contributes with an in-depth event study. Chapter five concludes 
this study. 
2 The Role of Standard-Setting Consortia 
Consumers face a coordination problem when choosing a standard as they do not know 
whether expected network benefits will be realized (Gandal, 2002, p. 81). Nonetheless, 
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complementors may expect consumers to join the network first, while consumers’ adoption 
decisions depend on available complementary goods such as software for hardware systems 
(referred to as “chicken-and-egg” problem, e.g. cf. Gandal, 2002). This is particularly true when 
competing standard candidates are similar in technology, when they address a similar use case 
and features provided do not differentiate them. Gandal (2002) also asks how standards should 
be set – by competition (de facto), by voluntary industry consensus or, as mandatory. 
Concerning optimal economic selection choice of standards, we need to account for rates of 
technological change, antitrust issues, but also the role of intellectual property in standard 
negotiation. Figure 1 illustrates the different streams of research on standard wars, whereas 
intentional members’ choice of consortia due to non-technological assets is a new field of study. 
 
Figure 1: Research on Standards Wars 
Standard
candidate
accident/chance intentional choice
due to technological 
advantage
demand-side supply-side
due to non-
technological assets 
of  the consortia
gate keeping,
shaping consumer 
demand 
co-evolution of  
consortia
 
Although there are some studies which stress the rise of consortia for setting de-facto standards 
(‘consortia movement’), there is little in-depth research on how consortia interact or, on their 
evolution in terms of social networks in the course of time.  
Diffusion of technologies, essentially by standard wars between incompatible technologies in 
the Entertainment industry, has been extensively studied in terms of competition driven by 
either technological superiority or demand-side network effects. Technological superiority of the 
Video Home System (VHS) in some attributes particularly determined the BETAMAX decline. 
Members of the BETAMAX consortium were Sony, NEC, Toshiba, Sanyo, Fisher, and Wega. 
VHS was developed by Victor Company of Japan (JVC) which is part of Matsushita Electric. 
The use case of both standard candidates is to offer films on a media which consumers could 
take along. In order to compensate the BETAMAX one year first mover advantage, JVC made 
early licensing agreements with General Electric, Philips, NEC, Toshiba, RCA and Sanyo. 
However, literature does not refer in detail to the dynamics of the VHS vs. BETAMAX-
consortia structure. According to Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) and opposed to Arthur (1990), 
the VHS vs. BETAMAX standard war (1973-1984, won by VHS) represents neither an 
inefficient outcome nor supremacy by chance. Furthermore, even though the tiny tape size of 
BETAMAX was designed by SONY to satisfy a ‘to-go’ attribute to consumers, the technology 
failed to sweep along a critical mass in the long run, although the format initially kept a majority 
of market share (Park, 2004). Every year, from 1978 on, BETAMAX was outsold by VHS. VHS 
  
4 
speeded their product development to provide 4 hours, respectively 6 hours of recording time, 
whereas Sony’s BETAMAX could only provide half of it (finally 5 hours in the late 1980s). In 
the 1980s, consumers used VCRs mainly to record TV programs. However, many programs 
such as sport events and movies required more than 2 hours of play time. Although SONY 
increased efforts to enhance playtime after an initial inferiority compared to JVC’s VHS tape 
length,3 markets anticipated play time as a disadvantage of the BETAMAX format throughout 
the entire standard war. Even though the VHS vs. BETAMAX war was also influenced by 
strategic behavior (licensing, cooperation and pricing strategies), technological supremacy 
determined its outcome (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). Note that technological supremacy of 
VHS was possibly not only achieved by tape length, but also by other – technological – factors. 
Some authors particularly argue for superior image quality of VHS (Park, 2004; Katz and 
Shapiro, 1994). In contrast to well-established studies on standard wars, but in line with recent 
research on collaborative R&D consortia, we look for strategic behavior of co-operating firms 
rather than for technological supremacy or for the single firm’s strategic behavior at product 
markets. The case of Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD differs from well-established literature on network 
effects and standard wars because contrary to VHS vs. BETAMAX, the HD-standards diffusion 
was not determined by the demand-side, and it is not a case of obvious technological supremacy 
of one standard candidate. Particularly, complementary goods create a comparative advantage, 
for instance: 
"What is most important to consumers is how much they are paying, and HD DVD is simply less expensive. 
[…] Focusing on one format will also allow us to provide better content because we're not splitting our attention.” 
(Rob Moore, Paramount Pictures, 21.08.2007) 
More precisely, our paper extends the literature on standard wars in two directions. First, we 
show how firms behave strategically as consortium members (via consortia decisions and 
announcements). Second, we develop an evolutionary view on standard wars driven by 
consortia. In line with Consoli (2008), we argue for a “co-evolution of capabilities” and, derived 
from that idea, for a co-evolution of consortia, respectively their agents who behave strategic 
and deploy coalitions (e.g., formalized as consortia, or reached by bilateral contracts) at all 
market arenas. Few studies explicitly deal with inter-firm consortia standard wars (e.g., Lim, 
2008); however, they do not sufficiently take an evolutionary perspective rooted in learning and 
market expectations which emerge from a series of events. Furthermore, we demonstrate that 
recent standard wars may not be decided by technological supremacy, but are driven by strategic 
behavior of consortia member firms. The case of Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD represents such a 
standard-setting case. Table 1 spells out the various meanings of ‘standard-setting consortia’. 
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Table 1: Standard-setting Consortia   
Alliances for Developing 
and Sponsoring Standards 
“A firm sponsors de facto standards either by promoting its own 
proprietary methods as a standard or by entering into an alliance to 
develop and promote standards favored by a coalition of firms.” 
(Axelrod et al., 1995). 
Consortia  “[Consortia are] a collection of like-minded interests that participate 
in the development of what may be a market accepted solution to 
what is perceived to be a user problem.” (Weiss and Cargill, 1992, p. 
560). 
“Lying somewhere roughly equidistant between the unilateral de facto 
standard impositions of Microsoft and the broad, participatory 
process leading to the development of de jure standards by bodies 
such as the ISO are a plethora of groupings of companies that have 
come together to address, most typically, a single discrete technical 
need. The common goals of these groupings may be as narrow as 
setting a consensus-based interface standard for music hardware and 
software (i.e., the MIDI Manufacturer’s Consortium), or as wide as 
promoting standards perceived as being necessary to enable the 
effective development of a new type of programming (i.e., the Object 
Management Group, or OMG, formed to promote and facilitate 
object-oriented programming techniques). These groupings, variously 
formal and informal, are usually referred to as consortia.” 
(Updegrove, 1995). 
Networks as regulators “[…] networks – institutions that facilitate interconnection between 
users of a good or service exhibiting network effects, and thus enable 
the realization of the network effects. Networks appear in many 
forms: trade associations, commodity exchanges, electricity grids, 
Internet auction sites, Peer-to-Peer and Business-to-Business 
exchanges, etc. In certain circumstances, networks are better 
regulators than the parties to the transaction or other third parties 
(such as the government).” (Aviram, 2003, p. 7). 
 
Weiss and Cargill (1992) distinguish between implementation consortia, application consortia, 
and proof-of-technology consortia. The case we present shares some characteristics with proof-
of-technology consortia but it differs in the objectives of the consortium’s biggest, most 
influential firms (hereafter referred to as incumbents). The Blu-ray and HD-DVD consortia do 
“work out the concepts of the technology prior to making major investments that will run 
counter to one another” but competition on concepts takes place between and not within the 
consortia; also note that competition is not fought out between single firms. We will thus 
demonstrate what constitutes a new category of standard-setting consortia, namely belief-
building consortia. Such consortia pursue an early diffusion momentum in the face of a finite 
standards life cycle and the maximization of innovation rents through signalizing high utility to 
an undecided consumer. 
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Figure 2: The Role of Standard-setting Consortia 
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Why does strategic behavior matter? Our concept of dynamics around a standard candidate and 
the means of consortia are illustrated in figure 2. The concept of consortia wars departs from 
standard wars-theory in two respects. First, consortia as groups of firms may have better 
information on emerging next generation of standard technology than single firms do have (see 
mark D in figure 2). Second, complementors (content providers) take a crucial role in the 
process of shaping demand and initializing demand-side network effects. Our concept is in line 
with evolutionary theory because we find that dynamics of consortia structures (in historical 
time) are crucial for understanding standard-setting processes and finally, crucial for standard-
setting success. Furthermore, the history of standard wars lets us assume that agents have learnt 
from previous standard wars (e.g. Sony was involved in VHS vs. Betamax, DVD-R vs. +R, Blu-
ray vs. HD-DVD). Third, most important, the war gaming between consortia brings increased 
costs in comparison to single firm standard wars; it may also delay an industry standard through 
a long-term stalemate between the leading consortia. Note that it is then important for a 
consortium to attract content-providers respective complementors, but also to convince the 
uncertain consumer to adopt the own standard candidate. Dedicated activities such as search, 
evaluation, selection and adoption of a standard candidate, but also backing decisions are 
subject to the variety of consortia members and possibly rival interests, which evolve and 
change in the course of time. 
In the case of Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD, consumers do not unfold network effects; they are waiting 
to see a superior standard candidate (dominant design) as they are uncertain about the intensity 
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and direction of future technology adoption dynamics (mark A in figure 2). Furthermore, we 
suggest that supply-side agents put pressure on each other, e.g., in terms of switching between 
consortia, announcements on the future technology diffusion at trade fairs, or by negotiating 
long-term backing agreements (see mark B in figure 2). An analysis of the interdependencies 
between product preannouncements, network externalities from installed base and consumer 
tastes is provided by Shurmer and Swann (1995). Complementary goods and asset providers 
(hereafter referred to as complementors) and incumbents (here, big firms in the Board of 
Directors/the Executive Board) function as gatekeepers in lead markets for a standard. Their 
activities – backing decisions and announcements – influence the reputation of the consortium, 
but they also shape consumer demand, e.g. via media and retail channels (see mark C in figure 
2). Furthermore note that strategic behavior of the firms anticipates the limited time span 
between standardization (the emergence of a dominant design) and the end of the standard 
lifecycle: new proposals worked out by other consortia or even from other overlapping markets 
emerge to replace the Blu-ray or HD-DVD standard (see mark D in figure 2). It is worth noting 
that complementors and vendors worry about long-lasting standard wars, which requires a quick 
development of stable standard platforms (Weiss and Cargill, 1992). The delay of standard 
adoption and the delay of complementary goods provided is a serious constraint to innovation 
rents which are captured from implementing a new standard. In the case of the successor Blu-
ray, we find press articles arguing the Blu-ray standard may be challenged by download business 
models in the near future. Moreover, the DVD-Forum has recently approved a high-definition 
download standard. The focus of this paper is on what is labeled as ‘mark C’ in figure 2. Agents 
try to signalize that a commitment for their favored standard-setting consortia will be an 
advantage in the near future; and they take several paths to convince and force the consumer to 
adapt to their standard candidate (e.g., via game console markets). If consumers and even 
complementors are cautious and wait for a winning standard, such signalizing turns out to be an 
important standard-setting capability.4 
If there is only one standard candidate, the intra-consortia process of standard-specification is 
mainly depending on the formation of coalitions (van Wegberg, 2004). We distinguish several 
trade-offs to be considered by the agents when choosing consortia design and technical scope. 
Such trade-offs concern consortia decisions on the one, and firm decisions related to the 
consortium's standards on the other hand. Note that Warner Bros. used different paths to 
establish a standard (van Wegberg, 2004; Farrell and Saloner, 1988): via market mechanisms, 
and via negotiations within and between consortia. 
 
Table 2: Trade-offs in Standard Wars 
Consortium decisions Size (bandwagon-effect)/time-to-specification (derived from Weiss and 
Cargill, 1992); and degree of compatibility/speed of standardization 
(van Wegberg, 2004) 
Value created (disruption)/value captured (evolution) 
Firm decisions Backing consortia, backing exclusively 
Value created/value captured (Simcoe, 2006) 
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As argued by Weiss and Cargill (1992, p. 563), “an incentive exists to get as many firms as possible into 
the consortium so that the size of the network will be as high as possible”. The larger the consortium, the 
more markets adopt to the standard candidate. At the same time, such inclusive consortia delay 
standards specification and decrease the effectiveness of consortia; bandwagon-effects become 
stronger but time-to-specification increases. Although the momentum for the finite specification 
proposal should be stronger for inclusive than for small consortia, those positive externalities 
are postponed. Note that the standards’ lifecycle is finite and thus the delay of specification 
means a loss of value capture for incumbents and complementors. The same applies to 
consumers: product lifetime becomes shorter but at constant switching costs. van Wegberg 
(2004, p. 20) argues that “a grand coalition [that is, an inclusive consortium] has a better chance of ensuring 
compatibility between the technologies used in an industry than competing coalitions”, but it “may also take more 
time to arrive at a decision than competing coalitions. It has more opposite interests to accommodate. This delay 
represents an intra-coalition coordination failure.” 
Simcoe (2006) argues for a trade-off between value created in terms of providing open 
standards and value captured respecting innovation rents from appropriation by closed 
standards. Open standards create more value, e.g. through increased compatibility, increased 
quality, lower product prices for users, and ‘restrictions on taxes by technology licensors’. 
Therefore, firms should collaborate on standards (create maximum value) but compete on 
implementation. Slowak (2008) suggests solving this trade-off by “a virtuous cycle of 
exploration and exploitation”. If simplified, that is, the collaborative advancement of a standard 
/business system from vintage to vintage by the consortium. As each agent appropriates a share 
of that shared created value by offering proprietary products and services, in absolute numbers, 
innovation rents increase. 
There is also a trade-off concerning value created (utility) in terms of disruption versus value 
captured in terms of evolution. Disruptive standard candidates may embed more novel 
functionality, they may also be advanced in their basic design but they may lack backward 
compatibility. Evolutionary standards rather assure backward compatibility as they incrementally 
advance technology; thus they maintain the installed base but may be less innovative. In our 
case study the question arises if creating an evolutional standard based on the DVD-format 
(e.g., download supplements standards) could have been a better strategy than creating a new 
type of high definition disk. Evolution versus disruption in standards specification in the course 
of different releases or between interrelated standards poses two different problems: An 
evolution of DVD in terms of HD-DVD devices which also play DVD disks places DVD and 
HD-DVD media in indirect competition. It turns HD-DVD “readiness” into an optional 
feature until film supplements transcend DVD storage capacity, or until a critical mass of 
households own HDTV-screens. A revolution of DVD in terms of incompatible Blu-ray rather 
places DVD and Blu-ray into direct competition, consumers need to switch the installed base in 
order to watch Blu-ray disks.  
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We conclude that all agents disagree with time-consuming decision processes and standard 
candidate-postponing alignments within or between consortia. Thus, “speeding up standardization 
will be valuable if the benefits from the standard are time-dependent.” (van Wegberg, 2004, p. 28).  
3 Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD: Technology and Market Shares 
Based on our event study, we identify several critical events related to the success of Blu-ray. 
Besides several crucial exclusive backing decisions of various Hollywood studios (e.g. Warner 
Bros., FOX, Universal, Paramount), the Blu-ray standard candidate was also exclusively chosen 
by movie rentals (e.g. Blockbuster, Netflix). However, the our study also highlights exclusive 
backing decisions of HD-DVD by global players, e.g. Dreamworks, Paramount Pictures still in 
the year 2008; we additionally analyzed the release dates of HD-movies, which do not at all 
reflect an obvious Blu-ray victory until February 2008 (figure 3). The first section is dedicated to 
the research question whether the HD-standard war has been decided by technological 
superiority as well.  
Proposition 1: ‘Image quality’ and ‘tape length’ or technological attributes of similar importance to the consumer 
have been crucial arguments for Blu-ray to prevail over HD-DVD. Alternatively, the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD 
standard war could have been decided just by chance.  
Note that the anticipated use-case could also lead to superior value of one standard candidate to 
the consumer. Table 3 gives a technical overview of both standard candidates.  
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Table 3: Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD Technology 
Technology 
characteristics a) 
Concerned agent Blu-ray HD-DVD 
Copy protection film industry, 
consumer (copy 
protection BD+ 
and BD-Rom) 
AACS5 , BD+, BD-Rom 
(BD+ = dynamic encryption 
coding; BD Rom = digital 
watermark)  
AACS 
Disc capacity consumer, PC 
industry a) 
1-layer: up to 20GB (2005) 
2-layer: up to 50GB (Oct 
2006) 
R&D announcements: 
4-layer: 100GB; 8-layer: 
200GB; 16-layer: 400GB 
(announced Jul 2008) 
1-layer: up to 15GB 
2-layer: up to 30GB 
(2006) 
3-layer: up to 45GB 
(Oct 2005) 
3-layer: up to 51GB 
(Nov 2007) 
Interactive 
platform/software 
gaming and film 
industries 
BD-J (Java based; SUN 
Microsystems) 
iHD (HDi; Microsoft) 
Video codec b) film industry, 
consumer 
MPEG2, H.264 (MPEG4, 
AVC) and VC-1; 1080i, 
1080p; transfer rate 36-54 
MBps; video bit rate: 28,0 
MBps 
MPEG2, H.264 
(MPEG4, AVC) and 
VC-1; 1080i, 1080p; 
transfer rate 36,55 
MBps; video bit rate: 
40,0 MBps 
Region coding film industry, 
game industry 
3 country groups (less then 
DVD)6 
not until 2007 c) 
Audio codec film industry, 
game industry 
Dolby Digital, PCM, Dolby 
True HD, DTS, DTS-HD 
Dolby Digital, PCM, 
Dolby True HD, DTS, 
DTS-HD 
a) For costs of player and disk manufacturing see Appendix. Costs of purchase are one crucial decision criterion in 
consumers’ choice of a standard 
b) The amount of high definition content that can be stored on a HD-disc is entirely dependent upon the codec used for 
encoding. Using the standard MPEG-2 DVD compression, a single-layer Blu-Ray disc (25GB) could hold two hours of 
HD programming, and doubling with MPEG-4 or VC-1 compression. 
c) At the very beginning, several HD-movies were exclusively launched on Blu-ray by Hollywood studios due to the missing 
region coding on HD-DVD. 
 
Image quality of both HD-formats is already specified via the 1080p HD video standard. Within 
this paper, technological superiority is defined as superior functionality of one standard 
candidate to the consumer at equal costs compared to other candidates. Thus, does ‘storage 
capacity’ as functionality make Blu-ray a superior technology from a consumer perspective? If 
we assume that 25GB of storage capacity equals approximately 135 minutes of compressed HD 
MPEG2 video, then run times are rather similar. In addition, MPEG4 compression offers even 
more playtime for both standard candidates. Consequently, blockbuster movies could be stored 
on both media without abdication. We conclude that storage capacity did not significantly vary 
between Blu-ray and HD-DVD until Warner’s crucial decision of backing Blu-ray exclusively 
(Appendix A for detailed events). The announcement of 100GB and 200GB Blu-ray multi-layer 
discs is not related to Blu-ray’s supremacy; these announcements were made after Toshiba’s 
final decision to stop research and development on HD-DVD. 
Brookey (2007) argues that “tech-savvy consumers are sure to recognize this difference, and are likely to resist 
any new format that does not appear to have a long shelf-life” (Brookey, 2007, p. 203); he continues, “In 
spite of this disadvantage, the HD-DVD has some advantages of its own. Because its numerical aperture is 
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smaller than Bluray, HD-DVD drives are backward compatible; in other words, when HD-DVD players hit 
the market they were able to play old DVDs with an upgraded image quality. Blu-ray on the other hand is not 
backward compatible, and its players will most likely have to include a separate drive for the legacy DVD 
format.” (Brookey, 2007, p. 203). Furthermore, different revisions for each HD-format constrain 
vertical compatibility and imply search costs/information asymmetries to the consumer, as 
theoretically discussed by Shy (1996) and van Wegberg (2004). 
The value added of additional Blu-ray disc capacity comes with serious disadvantages in 
compatibility, while the HD-DVD standard candidate provides enough capacity to store recent 
movies in HD-video quality. Altogether, the technological specification of the two standard 
candidates is quite similar in terms of consumer utility (excluding network effects, 
complementarity to other standards, and all kinds of systemic standard-setting characteristics or 
systemic innovation). Both formats, at least their latest revisions, provided a storage capacity up 
to approximately 51GB, which is sufficient for crystal-clear 1080p video and uncompressed 
audio blockbuster movies and add-ons.7  
“Though similar in design, the specification papers of the two formats do show a few technical differences.  One of 
the significant differences between the two mediums is that the laser’s aperture is different, with Blu-ray having a 
thinner protective layer (0.1nm) than both the HD-DVD and the DVD (who both share the same thickness of 
0.6nm, reducing costs for HD-DVDs to be produced). This allows Blu-ray to have a higher capacity than HD 
DVD, but at a higher cost to the manufacturer and ultimately the consumer.” (Zardis, 2007). 
TDK’s announcements of potential Blu-ray storage capacity of 100GB and future 200GB, if 
intended in timing and effect, express strategic behavior of the Blu-ray consortium. Agents also 
may have learnt from the VHS vs. BETAMAX format war that technological attributes matter; 
especially if such attributes are aggressively brought to consumer markets via backing/backing 
exclusively decisions and announcements of consortia members. More precisely, we argue that 
technology did not primarily decide the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war. If technological 
superiority was important to population dynamics and expectations of success, then this 
superiority was artificially created by events and the strengthening of ties between application 
segments, technology providers, complementors and consortia incumbents.  
Given similarity in the two standard candidates’ utility to the consumer, the Blu-ray format 
victory could be due to chance. Note that if assumed that only HD-DVD is compatible to 
DVD-hardware, the adjacent entrant Blu-ray should suffer from an already installed base of the 
HD-DVD Promotion Group (backed by the DVD Forum). Assuming a critical mass necessary 
for technology diffusion, a substantial increase of market share could determine the standard 
war in an early phase. Therefore, we first focus on the strategic role of content providers (table 
4). For each agent we assume a particular strategic behavior of each agent with respect to the 
standard-setting arena. Furthermore, each agent’s role determined by both technological 
competencies and standard-setting experience gained through learning from previous consortia 
projects. Therefore, we propose that agents as members of consortia leverage their market 
position but also advance the business environment in favor of their standard candidate: lead 
user-segments for HD-standards are home entertainment (movie studios, movie rental service 
providers, movie retail industry; including adult industry) and video (console) games.  
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Table 4: Film Industry Market Shares and Allegiance 
Studio 
market 
shares, 
2005  
market 
shares, 
2006  
market 
shares, 
2007  
market 
shares,  
2008  
Allegiance 2007 
HD-
DVD Blu-ray 
Warner Bros  21,21) 18,11) 18,8 1) 20,7 1) X X 
Paramount  10,5 9,7 13,4 2) 13,3 2) X   
Disney/Buena Vista 15,8 7) 15,4 13,1 12,2   X 
Sony (incl. Columbia) 12,5 12,6 13,5 11   X 
Universal 14 6) 11,3 10,7 11,1 X   
20th Century Fox 14 13,7 15,3 3) 14,7 3)   X 
Lionsgate 4,2 5,2 5,3 6,7   X 
Dreamworks - 3,2 5) - - X   
MGM 1,9 2,2 4) - - X X 
Other 5,9 14 9,9 10,4     
Cumulated market share  $23.8 billion $23.6 billion $22.9 billion $21.7 billion 42.9% 66,0% 
Source: Video Business (2009), Quarterly Market Data and The Economist (2008), Box Office Mojo, by box office 
revenue; 2005-2008 year-end total overall consumer spending, including year-end total sell through market share and year-
end total rental market share. 
1) Warner includes HBO and NewLine; 2) Paramount includes Dreamworks; 3) FOX includes MGM; 4) MGM 
belongs to SONY in Q1/Q2 and to FOX in Q3/Q4; 5) owned by Paramount but distributed by Universal for several 
months; 6)Universal includes Dreamworks; 7) includes Miramax Dimensions 
http://www.videobusiness.com/info/CA6630875.html  
 
In 2007, film studios merely support Blu-ray (see table 4). Besides Paramount, also Warner and 
Disney showed some attitude to back the HD-DVD format. Consequently, the unexpected turn 
of Warner Bros. towards Blu-ray was an absolute surprise for both, the HD-DVD consortia 
members, consumers and market observers. Note that most shifts towards the Blu-ray format 
happened in Q4/2006, 2007 and Q1/2008 (Appendix A; also figures 10 and 11). 
In addition to table 4, figure 3 gives some indication in terms of HD movie releases on both 
HD-standard candidates from Q2/2006 until Q1/2009.  
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Figure 3: Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD Movie Releases April 2006 until May 2009 
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Source: own illustration and calculations of movie releases based upon studio announcements and press releases on 
http://bluray.highdefdigest.com/releasedates.html; http://www.blu-ray.com/ and http://www.hddvd.com/ 
 
We identified no clear supremacy of Blu-ray in terms of movie releases until Warner’s 
announcement to back Blu-ray exclusively (Q1/2008). HD-DVD movie releases then continued 
until June 2008, however decreasing. It is also clearly visible that the majority of content 
providers postponed technology adoption until a final restructuring of both consortia in terms 
of backing decisions has happened in Q1/2008; the early market takeoff can be dated to winter 
2008/2009. Similar to the VHS vs. BETAMAX standard war, analysts assigned a strategic role 
to the adult movie industry and movie rental service providers in the HD standard war. Indeed, 
our event study identifies several events within the adult movie industry (backing standard 
candidates) that contribute to consortia structure dynamics (Appendix A). 
In addition to the share of movie releases on HD-standard candidates, figure 4 highlights the 
calculated market shares of Blu-ray and HD-DVD movie sales in the US market for the time 
period April 2006 until May 2009 (weekly and monthly data). It is highly visible, when 
comparing figure 4 with table 4 and Appendix A, that the standard candidates’ market share of 
HD movie sales fluctuates synchronously with the market share of HD-technology 
backing/backing exclusively movie studios. This may imply that the share of weekly/monthly 
unit sales in the US market lags behind the market share of backing/backing exclusively 
decisions of movie studios. Consequently, we interpret the sales development as an outcome of 
ex ante strategic ‘backing/backing exclusively’ decisions of content providers (complementors). 
According to figures 3 and 4, the main standard war began around Q3/2006 and lasted eighteen 
months (Q1/2008).  
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Figure 4: Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD - US-Market Share of HD-Disc Sales  
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New digital video formats such as Blu-ray and HD-DVD additionally allow for watching high-
definition videos on video game consoles. In the case of Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD the use-case of 
both standard candidates does not differ. Both standard candidates are designed to allow 
watching high-definition videos, and both take advantage of game consoles as a lead market 
(Japan, USA) for relevant video codices; but additionally at the strength of their installed base of 
Blu-ray/HD-DVD players. Thus, eminent effort has been made by both HD-consortia in 
attracting agents from the game development industries, e.g. Electronic Arts, Vivendi (see also 
figure 11). Today’s game consoles essentially contribute to the diffusion speed of high-definition 
storage media, as the game industry is in need of additional storage capacity, which is limited by 
recent DVD technology. We conclude that the introduction of Sony’s PlayStation 3 (PS3) and 
Microsoft’s XBOX 360 in lead markets such as USA and Japan was of strategic importance for 
both consortia; game consoles may include HD-players (integrated or add on) and thus increase 
a standard candidate’s installed base which consequently increases network externalities and 
creates predictions of success. Figure 5 highlights the evolution of US game console sales 
between Q4/2007 and Q4/2008. Notice, that the time path of each console technology is 
different, although Q4 always peaks for each console during Christmas time.  
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Figure 5: US Game Console Sales 
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Source: own illustration; data from Shilov, A.: Video Game Console Market Continues Its Formidable Growth in the 
U.S. – NPD Group, Feb 12, 2009 
(http://www.xbitlabs.com/news/multimedia/display/20090212170954_Video_Game_Console_Market_Continues_
to_Grow_in_the_U_S__NPD_Group.html). 
 
Complementary to the US market, we analyzed Japanese sales: game consoles sales in year 2008 
for Japan are as follows (in units sold), Nintendo DS (4,029,804), Sony PlayStation Portable 
(3,543,171), Nintendo Wii (2,908,342), Sony Play Station 3 (991,303), and Microsoft Xbox 360 
(317,859).8 However, it is essential to note that the HD-DVD player for the XBOX 360 was an 
external device, whereas the PS3 has a built-in technology. However, a detailed analysis of 
installed-base lacks consistent data: neither are all PS3 used for HD movies, nor are all XBOX 
360 consoles on the market equipped with an HD-DVD player (add-on). Technological 
comparison as in table 3, the late take-off of movie releases on Blu-ray in autumn 2008 (see 
figure 3), and the dynamics in market shares in the year 2007 (see figure 4) indicate that both 
standard candidates were perceived as equivalent by the market. Proposition 1 (see p. 9) does 
not hold and thus, the case of Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD is different from the case of VHS vs. 
Betamax. We propose: 
Proposition 2: Strategic behavior which leads to dynamics in bargaining power of agents and uncertainty in 
standards specification (including the pace of innovation by standards releases) shifts competition on 
implementation of standards from a technology to a market arena. Standard-setting capabilities and given 
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opportunities from market structure matter, not only technological competence or innovation performance of the 
single firm. 
In an interview conducted to Ars Technica by Microsoft Director for Platform Strategies, Scott 
Henson, he stated that the Xbox 360 HD-DVD drive would likely never be internalized into 
Microsoft’s XBOX 360 game console because "[we] don't want to charge customers $200 extra for 
something that may be the next Betamax." (Ars Technica, 2007, Interview from January 2007). Above 
statement either indicates that the means of predictions is not understood by consortia members 
or that Microsoft has lost its belief in a HD-DVD success. Cooperation, coordination and 
timing of events and announcements appear to be crucial for a successful diffusion of standard 
candidates, particularly in respect to internalization of predictions of lead users and markets for 
complementary goods. However, consortia members not always behave fully allegiant towards 
their associates. By conducting an event study on consortia structures, we identified some 
interesting suspiciousness between several HD-DVD Promotion group members, which appear 
crucial for the ongoing HD standard war. We also found evidence for some strategic payments 
by promotion groups to critical consortia members as an essential instrument in diffusing the 
own standard candidate. Subsequent chapter four provides significant evidence for our second 
proposition. 
4 Structural Dynamics in the Case of Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD 
“[Blu-ray] is an extremely complex animal. Small supporters could have a big impact if they judge their work for 
the format to be strategically important, while big company bureaucracy could make their support for a format 
irrelevant. Since data on small and private company supporters is less accessible, we’ll just have to wait and see 
how the game plays out.” (HDBlu.com, In the War of Supporters, Blu-Ray Has a Big Lead, Nov 6, 2006, 
http://www.hdblu.com/reviews/supporters.htm). 
As we argued, there is no obvious technological supremacy in favor of the winning standard 
candidate Blu-ray. Thus, cause and effect are not rooted in technology only, but seem to be 
either driven by market structure or psychology. Accordingly, we unfold that the structure of 
consortia and the activities of complementors determined the DVD successor. Although each 
agent acts according to a particular set of strategies in the sense of economic game theory, it is 
the dynamics unfold by the interaction within the population of agents which leads to 
consumer’s adoption and backing decisions of supply-side agents. One method to account for 
complex consortia structures is a social network analysis. Figure 6 highlight the consortia 
structures of the Bluray Disc Association and the HD-DVD Promotion Group (as of the year 
2006). 
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Figure 6: The Consortia Networks behind Blu-ray and HD-DVD (year 2006) 
Source: own illustration; data from www.mediabiz.de and from event study (Appendix A) 
 
A separate network graph is related to the executive board members (figure 7) and clarifies that 
the Blu-ray technology benefits from a structural advantage in terms of firm membership: a first 
point is that the Blu-ray consortium has more executive members compared to the HD-DVD 
consortium; secondly, several HD-DVD executive members are committed to both consortia.  
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Figure 7: The Incumbents behind Blu-ray and HD-DVD (year 2006) 
 
 
 
Source: own illustration; data from www.mediabiz.de and from event study (Appendix A). 
 
In line with evolutionary theory, we find (1) interactions between heterogeneous agents: big 
technology firms (incumbents), complementors (content providers) and specialized technology 
providers (hardware/ software manufacturers); (2) heterogeneity of agents with respect to firm 
size and innovativeness; and (3), we assume that there are learning effects from previous 
standard wars, which determine supply-side activities. 
Finally, figures 8 and 9 illustrate how attention to each standard candidate varies in the course of 
time. We argue that the diffusion of a standard in modern times comes with information search 
activities of consumers, which are conducted via internet search engines and information at the 
standard-setting consortia homepages. Thus, events, which shape consumers’ demand for a 
standard candidate, also initialize active search activities of potential consumers. They attract 
undecided consumers who postpone expenditures until the very last minute of a standard war. 
The search engine indices provided in figures 8 and 9 could be taken as a proxy for the 
consumers’ attention to each standard candidate within a five-year period. 
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Figure 8: Search Statistics for “Blu-ray” vs. “HD DVD” on the Search Engine Google 
 
 
Figure 9: Search Statistics for “Blu-ray” vs. “DVD” on the Search Engine Google 
 
Source for figure 8 and 9: Google Labs, Trends (http://www.google.com/trends?q=Blu-
ray%2C+HD+DVD&ctab=0&geo=all&date=all&sort=1) as to February 21, 2009. 
“Google Trends analyzes a portion of Google web searches to compute how many searches have been done for the terms you 
enter, relative to the total number of searches done on Google over time. ... The data Trends produces may contain 
inaccuracies for a number of reasons, including data-sampling issues and a variety of approximations that are used to 
compute results.” (http://www.google.com/intl/en/trends/about.html, About Google Trends). 
Data has been normalized; 1.0 represents the average search traffic for “Blu-ray” during the selected time period (all years). 
Note that only English-language headlines can be displayed by the application (here marked A-F). 
 
We conduct an event study on the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war. We assume that each 
agent committed to the HD-technology has an explicit strategy for backing or taking an 
opposition against each of the two consortia (see figures 10 and 11). Previously, we have 
elaborated technological advantages and commitment to one standard candidate – either Blu-ray 
or HD-DVD. Nonetheless, we also identify activities which are neutral between both standard 
candidates. As follows, activities which aim to back both standard candidates or, alternatively, 
aim to introduce compatible products are referred to as activities for a hybrid standard. We use 
essential outcomes of our event study to elaborate the evolution of standard candidates in the 
course of time. As illustrated in figure 10, there were several tendencies towards a hybrid HD 
standard, which combines specifications from both competing consortia.  
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Figure 10: Convergence/Divergence towards a Hybrid Standard in the HD Market 
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Source: own illustration; events are based upon Appendix A and scored according to Appendix B.  
 
However, first, after first official press releases and meetings of the two consortia 
representatives in Q2/2005, negotiations were stopped and a convergence of the standard 
candidates’ technological specifications finally failed in Q3/2005 (Appendix A). Secondly, we 
identified two additional developments towards a hybrid technology: the development of a HD 
hybrid disc, labeled ‘Total Hi Def Disc’ of Warner Bros. and the development of hybrid HD 
players, which were officially announced between Q4/2006 and Q1/2007 (Samsung, LG and 
Warner Bros). Warner values the development of the ‘Total Hi Def Disc’ as follows: 
“The Total Hi Def disc is about giving consumers complete choice, providing creators and artists the greatest 
possible distribution of their work, and helping retailers thrive in the marketplace. By eliminating potential 
apprehension over formats, we believe this new disc could help consumers fully embrace the greatest home 
entertainment experience available." (Kevin Tsujihara, President of Warner Bros. Home Entertainment Group, 
Jan 09, 2007) 
However, Warner Bros. finally stopped the introduction of their hybrid HD-disc and backed 
Blu-ray exclusively in Q1/2008 (Appendix A):  
“Warner Bros. has produced in both high-definition formats in an effort to provide consumer choice, foster 
mainstream adoption and drive down hardware prices. […] Today’s decision by Warner Bros. to distribute in a 
single format comes at the right time and is the best decision both for consumers and Time Warner. […] Warner 
Bros.’ move to exclusively release in the Blu-ray disc format is a strategic decision focused on the long term and the 
most direct way to give consumers what they want. […] The window of opportunity for high-definition DVD 
could be missed if format confusion continues to linger. We believe that exclusively distributing in Blu-ray will 
further the potential for mass market success and ultimately benefit retailers, producers, and most importantly, 
consumers. […] A two-format landscape has led to consumer confusion and indifference toward high definition, 
which has kept the technology from reaching mass adoption and becoming the important revenue stream that it 
can be for the industry,” (Barry Meyer, Chairman & CEO, Warner Bros. and Kevin Tsujihara, President, 
Warner Bros. Home Entertainment Group, January 4, 2008 – Burbank, CA) 
 
  
21 
In addition, we depict in our event study that strategic behavior emerged in the course of time; 
agents substitute technological arguments for their favorite standard candidate by media-
effective backing/backing exclusively decisions and consortia announcements. Given that 
consumption of standard candidates in the early phase of the technology life-cycle is highly 
dependent on consumer’s capabilities, skills and the underlying knowledge (Loasby, 2000, p. 
306), then, the purchasing process is characterized by uncertainty, heterogeneous needs and thus 
different use-cases of technology (Loasby, 2000, p. 307; Consoli, 2008, p. 413). If either there is 
no functional or technological differentiation in standard technology and design or if 
information asymmetries hide the differences, then demand-side agents cannot develop explicit 
preferences. Indeed, Blu-ray and HD-DVD provide similar quality to the consumer:  
 
“There is no real difference in quality based on what I’ve seen between HD DVD and Blu-ray. I don’t know 
how quickly these two competing formats will catch on, but when it comes to image quality, they both look great.” 
(Kuchera, 2007, Ars Technica) 
 
Moreover, figure 11 shows an increasing structural disadvantage of the HD-DVD standard 
candidate (in terms of firm affiliation to the HD-DVD consortium). More and more executive 
members (with strategic positions), who were initially committed to both consortia, afterwards 
backed Blu-ray exclusively. 
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Figure 11: Consortia Dynamics - Backing/Backing both/Backing Exclusively Decisions of 
Hardware/Software Manufacturers, Content Providers, Retailers and Rental Service Providers 
Period 2004-2005: Backing/Backing both/Backing Exclusively Decisions 
 
Period 2006-2007: Backing/Backing both/Backing Exclusively Decisions 
 
Period 2008: Backing/Backing both/Backing Exclusively Decisions 
 
 
Source: own illustration, based upon Appendix A 
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5 Conclusions 
The existing literature on technology diffusion provides several case studies and models on 
standard adoption. Research particularly illustrates the means of network size and positive 
externalities, technological supremacy, compatibility in systemic markets, or path dependency. 
As HD-DVD and Blu-ray represent almost identical technologies, the demand-side faced high 
risk of choosing the wrong standard candidate due to incompatibility. We exposed a case where 
strategic behavior of consortia has caused the success of one standard candidate, namely Blu-
ray. We also unfold non-linear dynamics: for instance, although HD-DVD dominated Google 
search indices statistics opposed to Blu-ray until Q1/2008, the standard war suddenly shifted in 
favor of Blu-ray in Q1/2008. Before that, several activities (and alternative possibilities) to unify 
both technologies and to establish a hybrid HD-standard failed. Note that the number of movie 
releases during the standard war did not differ systematically. In opposition to the HD-case, the 
often cited VHS vs. BETAMAX standard war has been clearly decided by technological 
supremacy of VHS and thus emphasizes sovereign adoption choice of the consumer.  
The economic problem in consortia-driven standards wars on similar technologies is as follows. 
Neither supply-side agents nor consumers want to exclusively commit to back a standard which 
could turn out as the ‘underdog’ in the end of the standards war. Both supply-side and demand-
side agents share the interest to reach one industry-standard. Reasons are economies of scale in 
production, and positive network effects by increasing the installed base. Furthermore, there are 
incentives to maximize revenue streams from standard implementation within a finite 
technology life time. The chicken-and-egg-problem describes the fact that each agent is waiting 
for the mass of other agents to lock into a standard and thus to decrease uncertainty on future 
network effects. Nonetheless, the more the majority of agents, and in particular the consumer, is 
unable to objectively identify and evaluate technological advantages, the more a lack of 
standards adoption arises. Given a finite technology standard life cycle, supply-side agents in the 
case of Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD thus unfold activities to alter the value of standard candidates by 
backing/backing exclusively decisions and by announcements in favor of their own candidate’s 
‘expected market success’. Consortia substitute the crucial demand-side adoption and thus 
lacking positive consumption externalities from a dominant design. The accumulated ‘backing 
exclusively’ announcements of content providers (e.g. movie studios) in Q1/2008 finally 
decided the standard war. 
Our main argument is that supply-side activities in consortia-driven standard wars may address a 
lack of adoption momentum by strategic behavior. Such behavior inter alia concerns the design 
and collaboration rules (institutions) of consortia, but also an economical design of standards 
specifications. We outlined crucial economic trade-offs to be considered by agents when 
disclosing knowledge to consortia or dedicating competitive assets. First, there is a critical size 
of consortia needed to reach a standard-setting momentum. Consortia structures in the HD-
case were highly dynamic due to announcements and a co-evolution of backing decisions. 
Second, incumbents and specialized technology providers need to open up technology in order 
to attract complementors and finally consumers; but at the same time they try to profit from 
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appropriated inputs in terms of subsequent licensing (e.g. proprietary video codices included by 
Microsoft). Third, each consortia needs to balance between evolution in standards design for 
momentum from installed-base (here, e.g. backward-compatibility to DVD) versus giving 
consumers incentives to switch (disruptive functionality). Our social network analysis 
demonstrates that both standard candidates are supported by a large number of firms with 
different strategic positions. However, in terms of executive board memberships and backing 
exclusively decisions, Blu-ray could increase its structural advantage in the course of time. 
Finally, the HD-DVD consortium has lost the standard war, because it has been hardly backed 
exclusively by agents (e.g. content providers) in the crucial time frame. 
Finally, the paper demonstrates how events can be used to analyze convergence/divergence 
tendencies between competing standard candidates and that the interplay between consortia, not 
only between firms, may create non-linear diffusion dynamics. We provide a behavioral 
approach based on the deployment of non-technological assets of the consortia. Rooted in 
heterogeneous consortia structures, we assume that agents’ activities reflect current activities 
within and between consortia. These activities also incorporate knowledge and experience from 
past standard wars experience (e.g. Sony’s position in several standard wars). Accordingly, we 
suggest that consortia, in terms of social network analyses, represent a fruitful level of analysis 
and, increasingly, the locus of strategizing. 
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Appendix A 
The original consortia information web page is only still available for Blu-ray, but not for HD-DVD. Thus, our event analysis is based on a key word 
search at the search engine Google. A consortia-independent key word search also better represents the markets’ perception of the standards war in 
the course of time.  
Date Agent Standard Candidate Score Description 
Jan-95 DVD Forum  - Consortium founded by Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Pioneer, Philips, Sony, Thomson, Time Warner, Toshiba, Victor Company of Japan (JVC) 
Oct-00 Sony, Pioneer BD 0,5 DVR Blue presented at Ceatec, Japan (later on first Blu-ray Disc revision, BD-RE) 
Jan-02 Toshiba HDDVD - Specification proposal HD-DVD at DVD Forum 
Feb-02 Sony BD - Blu-ray Disc plans are unveiled 
Feb-02 Blu-ray Disc Association BD - Consortium formed by Hitachi, LG, Panasonic, Pioneer, Philips, Samsung, Sharp, Matsushita, Sony, and Thomson 
Feb-02 
Hitachi, LG, Panasonic, 
Pioneer,  Philips, Samsung, 
Matsushita, Sharp, Sony, 
Thomson 
BD 0,5 Announcement of basic specifications 
Mar-02 DVD Forum, Warner Bros. HDDVD 0,5 DVD forum approves the dual-layer DVD-9 disc (HD-DVD) 
Aug-02 NEC, Toshiba HDDVD - HD-DVD (Advanced Optical Disc, AOD) proposed to be the next successor standard of DVD  
Feb-03 Sony BD - Licensing of Blu-ray Disc begins. 
Apr-03 Sony BD - First devices in stores (Sony BDZ-S77, Japan) 
Jan-04 Dell, HP BD 1 Backing 
Mar-04 DVD-Forum, Microsoft HDDVD 0,5 
Microsoft's Windows Media 9 (VC-9) codec is selected by the DVD Forum; the codec will be required for all players in 
addition to MPEG-2 and H.264; condition: MS must modify license terms and propose the codec as open standard at 
Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers 
Jun-04 Panasonic (Matsushita Electric) BD  Second manufacturer after Sony who launches devices (player???) in Japanese stores 
Jun-04 DVD-Forum  HDDVD 0,5 HD-DVD format approved 
Aug-04 Sony BD 0,5 Physical specifications are finished 
Sep-04 BDA, Microsoft BD - 
Blu-ray Disc will use several codices: MPEG-2, H.264 and Microsoft's VC-1. As VC-1 becomes included in both 
standards, Blu-ray and HD-DVD, Microsoft will gain royalties despite the fact which of both standard candidates will 
win the HD disc format war. 
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Oct-04 20th Century Fox BD 1 
Backing, and on July 29, 2005 the studio officially announced its support for Blu-ray Disc. Twentieth Century Fox 
formally announced its support of the Blu-ray Disc format as a next-generation optical standard and joined the now 14-
member board of Blu-ray Disc Association (BDA). Fox is the second movie studio to announce support for Blu-ray 
Disc. 
Oct-04 Blu-ray Disc Association BD - Blu-Ray Disc Association (BDA) launches with more than 70 companies: growth from 13 to 73 companies over the last three months. 
Oct-04 JVC BD 1 Backing 
Nov-04 
Paramount Pictures, Universal 
Pictures, Warner Bros. 
Pictures, HBO, New Line 
Cinema 
HDDVD 1 Backing 
Nov-04 Universal Pictures HDDVD 1 Backing 
Dec-04 Blu-ray Disc Association BD 0,5 Announcement of additional software specifications; allows linking games to movies on BD  
Dec-04 
Walt Disney Company (incl. 
Buena Vista Home 
Entertainment) 
BD 2 Backing, exclusively 
Dec-04 HD-DVD Consortium HDDVD  Consortium is formed by Toshiba 
Dec-04 Badai Visual BD 1 Backing 
Jan-05 Vivendi Games, Electronic Arts BD 1 Backing 
Feb-05 BDA BD  BDA surpasses 100 Members 
Mar-05 Apple BD 1 Backing 
Mar-05 Apple   - Apples new QuickTime Version 7 will support the H.264 Advanced Video Codec (AVC)  
Apr-05 Sony BD/HDDVD 2 Sony open to HD DVD/Blu-ray convergence 
May-05 Toshiba BD/HDDVD 1/1 Toshiba refuses convergence of the two formats 
May-05 TDK BD - BD Prototype developed with 100GB. [Not said, if ready for mass production]  
Jun-05 BDA, SUN BD 0,5 SUN announces that BDA has chosen Java-based BD-J interactivity layer instead of Microsoft's HDi 
Jul-05 Verbatim Corporation (Mitsubishi Chemical Media) BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Aug-05 Lions Gate HE BD 1 Backing 
Aug-05 Universal Music BD 1 Backing 
Aug-05 DVD-Forum, HD-DVD Promotion Group, BDA BD/HDDVD 1/1 Negotiations to unify standards has failed 
Sep-05 Sony BD 1 Sony expects Blu-ray victory within 12 months 
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Sep-05 Samsung BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Sep-05 Microsoft, Intel HDDVD 1 Backing 
Sep-05 Aplix BD 1 Backing; aims to accelerate the integration of Java in BD 
Oct-05 BDA BD - BDA surpasses 150 members 
Oct-05 Paramount BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Oct-05 Warner Bros. (incl. Warner Home Video) BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Oct-05 Microsoft, Intel, HP BD - After demands of modifications of the Blu-ray disc standard by Microsoft and Intel, also Hewlett-Packard requests consortia negotiations related to technical possibilities of protected copies on home-based servers. 
Nov-05 Metro Goldwyn Mayer BD 1 Backing 
Nov-05 MGM BD 1 Backing 
Dec-05 HP BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Jan-06 Digital Playground BD 1 Backing 
Jan-06 Pioneer BD - Pioneer places a premium on high-definition Blu-ray media players 
Jan-06 Netflix BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Jan-06 Microsoft HDDVD 0,5 Xbox 360 to get external HD DVD player 
Mar-06 LG BD/HDDVD 0,5/0,5 LG Electronics to produce HD DVD drives in addition to Blu-ray 
Mar-06 Toshiba HDDVD - First devices in stores (HD-A1 player) 
Apr-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 0,6 6 movies 
May-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,5 15 movies 
Jun-06 BD BD 1,4 14 movies 
Jun-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,1 11 movies 
Jul-06 BD BD 0,6 6 movies 
Jul-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,3 13 movies 
Aug-06 BD BD 1,2 12 movies 
Aug-06 SUN Microsystems BD 1 Backing 
Aug-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,4 14 movies 
Aug-06 20th Century Fox, Warner Bros.   - 20th Century-Fox will finally join Warner, releasing Blu-ray titles 
Sep-06 BD BD 2,3 23 movies 
Sep-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 2,3 23 movies 
Oct-06 BD BD 3,0 30 movies 
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Oct-06 
American Independent Media 
Manufacturers Association 
(AIMMA) 
HDDVD 1 Backing 
Oct-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 2,3 23 movies 
Oct-06 NEC BD/HDDVD 2 NEC unveils chip to bridge Blu-ray/HD DVD divide 
Nov-06 BD BD 2,8 28 movies 
Nov-06 Sony BD 0,5 Sony's PlayStation 3, which packs a Blu-ray Disc drive, goes on sale in Japan 
Nov-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 2,4 24 movies 
Nov-06 Universal Studios HDDVD - Universal Studios claims to have the first true HD movie on HD DVD 
Dec-06 BD BD 2,0 20 movies 
Dec-06 HD-DVD HDDVD 2,2 22 movies 
Dec-06 HD-DVD Promotion Group HDDVD - Encryption cracked 
Jan-07 BD BD 3,0 30 movies 
Jan-07 Hitachi BD 0,5 100 GB Blu-ray Disc presented (four layers) 
Jan-07 LG BD/HDDVD 0,5/0,5 Dual-format Blu-ray/HD DVD player announced 
Jan-07 Warner Bros. BD/HDDVD 0,5/0,5 HD DVD - Blu-ray combo disc (Total HD) announced  
Jan-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,7 17 movies 
Jan-07 Toshiba HDDVD - Player for $600 announced 
Jan-07 Microsoft, Broadcom   - Microsoft, Broadcom aim to lower cost of HD DVD players 
Jan-07 TDK BD 0,5 200-GB-Blu-Ray-Discs and Mini Blu-Ray Discs for Camcorder/7,5 GB presented at CES 2007 
Feb-07 BD BD 2,8 28 movies 
Feb-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,5 15 movies 
Feb-07 Spielberg Movie???? HDDVD - Spielberg denies to release movies on HD-DVD  
Feb-07 Sony BD 1 Sony claims victory of BD over HD-DVD towards the magazine Video Business; according to Nielsen VideoScan US sales analysis; marketing campaign in the US market is planned 
Mar-07 BD BD 1,5 15 movies 
Mar-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 0,5 5 movies 
Apr-07 BD BD 1,8 18 movies 
Apr-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,4 14 movies 
Apr-07 Toshiba  - The HD-A20 carries a suggested retail price of $500, while the MSRP of the HD-A2 has been dropped to $400 
May-07 BD BD 2,4 24 movies 
May-07 Funai BD 1 Backing 
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May-07 LFP (adult Industry) BD - Adult movie plans announced 
May-07 HP BD/HDDVD - Plans for hybrid player/writer announced 
May-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 2,6 26 movies 
May-07 Toshiba HDDVD - Player hits sub-$300 mark 
Jun-07 BD BD 2,0 20 movies 
Jun-07 BDA BD - Consumers who buy any Blu-ray player from July to September will get five movies from various labels including Sony, Disney, Fox, MGM, Paramount, Lionsgate and Warner Brothers. 
Jun-07 Sony BD - Player hits sub-$500 mark 
Jun-07 Starz/Anchorbay BD 1 Backing 
Jun-07 Warner Bros. BD/HDDVD - Blu-ray-HD DVD combo disc plans cancelled 
Jun-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 3,1 31 movies 
Jul-07 BD BD 1,7 17 movies 
Jul-07 BJ's BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jul-07 European Commission BD - European Commission is to investigate suggested anti-competitive business moves of BDA 
Jul-07 Questar BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jul-07 Razor Digital BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jul-07 Target BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jul-07 Tartan Video BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jul-07 Samsung BD/HDDVD 0,5/0,5 hybrid player announced 
Jul-07 Target BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Jul-07 Tartan Video BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Jul-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 2,8 28 movies 
Jul-07 HD-DVD Promotion Group HDDVD 1 HD-DVD group claims victory against Blu-ray in Q2 
Jul-07 Microsoft HDDVD - Xbox 360 HD DVD player hits $179 mark 
Jul-07 Toshiba HDDVD - Player hits $113 mark 
Jul-07 Toshiba HDDVD - Player hits $299 mark 
Aug-07 BD BD 1,3 13 movies 
Aug-07 Samsung BD - Player hits $425 mark 
Aug-07 Acer BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Aug-07 Studio Canal BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Aug-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,2 12 movies 
Aug-07 Paramount, Dreamworks HDDVD 2 Backing exclusively (for 18 months); New York Times reports that 150 Mio US $ have been paid for abandoning Blu-ray 
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Aug-07 
Kinowelt, Capelight Pictures, 
Polyband, Concorde, 
Highlight, Kinowelt, 
Universum Film, Koch Media 
BD 1 Backing 
Sep-07 BD BD 2,7 27 movies 
Sep-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 3,6 36 movies 
Oct-07 BD BD 5,6 56 movies 
Oct-07 BDA BD - 
The specifications of the BD+ virtual machine are available only to licensed device manufacturers. A list of licensed 
commercial adopters is available from the BD+ website. The first titles using BD+ were released in October 2007. 
Versions of the BD+ protection have been circumvented by various versions of the AnyDVD HD program, including 
a new version of BD+ released in November 2008, and later cracked by AnyDVD on December 29, 2008. 
Oct-07 Lipinski Sound BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Oct-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 3,9 39 movies 
Oct-07 Microsoft, Toshiba HDDVD - Advanced Interactivity Consortium (AIC) is founded 
Nov-07 BD BD 3,9 39 movies 
Nov-07 Bestbuy HDDVD - Players hit 100$ mark 
Nov-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,9 19 movies 
Nov-07 Wal Mart HDDVD - Players hit 100$ mark 
Nov-07 Sony BD - Sony begins selling a lower cost version of the PlayStation 3. 
Nov-07 HD-DVD Promotion Group HDDVD 0,5 Triple-layer specification is approved by DVD Forum  
Dec-07 BD BD 2,9 29 movies 
Dec-07 LG BD/HDDVD - Hybrid player in stores 
Dec-07 HD-DVD HDDVD 2,7 27 movies 
Dec-07 BDA, HD-DVD Promotion Group BD/HDDVD - Up scaling DVD players cut into sales for both HD formats 
Jan-08 Apple BD 1 Apple claims Blu-ray victory 
Jan-08 BD BD 2,5 25 movies 
Jan-08 Blockbuster BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 FS Film BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 Future Shop Canada BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 Grant's Electronics BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 HBO BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 National Geographic BD 2 Backing exclusively 
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Jan-08 New Line Cinema BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 Sonic BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 Sony, Sharp BD - Free Sony player for every new Sharp TV Set 
Jan-08 Warner Bros. BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 Woolworth´s  BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Jan-08 BBC BD/HDDVD 2 Backing both 
Jan-08 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,2 12 movies 
Jan-08 Toshiba HDDVD - HD-A3 player hits US$150 mark 
Jan-08 US Super Bowl Event HDDVD - HD DVD commercial exclusively 
Feb-08 BD BD 2,2 22 movies 
Feb-08 Best Buy BD 1 Claims Blu-ray victory 
Feb-08 Harman Kardon BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Hi Fi Klubben BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Highlight Films BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Netflix BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Paramount BD - Paramount Pictures announced it would be releasing movies on Blu-ray Disc format. 
Feb-08 Scanbox BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Tripictures BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Universal Studios BD - Universal Studios announced it would be releasing movies on Blu-ray Disc format. 
Feb-08 Circuit City HDDVD - Players hit $112 mark 
Feb-08 HD-DVD HDDVD 1,9 19 movies 
Feb-08 Microsoft HDDVD - Microsoft drops price of Xbox 360 HD DVD add-on 
Feb-08 Microsoft HDDVD - Microsoft stops making external HD DVD drives for its Xbox 360 game console 
Feb-08 Filmax, Tripictures BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Nievus BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Amazon HDDVD - HDDVD discs discount by 50% 
Feb-08 Wal Mart BD 2 Backing exclusively 
Feb-08 Toshiba HDDVD - Toshiba's announcement on February 19, 2008 that it would no longer develop or manufacture HD DVD players and drives. 
Mar-08 Microsoft HD Downloads - Microsoft claims that physical discs will disappear in favor of download standards and announces Microsoft XBOX Live 
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Mar-08 HD-DVD Promotion Group HDDVD - Promotion group officially dissolved on March 28, 2008 
Jun-08 DVD Forum HD Downloads - Approval of the mark for Download/DL technology 
Feb-09 DVD Forum HD Downloads - Download/DL licensing specifications revealed 
Source: own illustration; events are collected by applying the following search runs: key words include the consortia names "Blu-ray Disc Founder Group" OR "Blu-ray Disc Association" OR 
"HD DVD Promotion Group" and exclude Wikipedia pages. Search queries have been separated for each year from 2001 to 2008. For instance, our query for year 2008 is: "Blu-ray Disc 
Founder Group" OR "Blu-ray Disc Association" OR "HD DVD Promotion Group" "2002" -Wikipedia. We furthermore conduct a search on the term ‘standard war’, e.g. Blu-ray HD 
DVD standard war "2008" -Wikipedia. Finally, the list of events is completed as to our best knowledge from secondary analysis such as technology reports or documents and press releases 
issued by leading consortia members. Data sources (press releases, hyper links) are available upon request. 
Appendix B 
Movie releases in Appendix A are scored and used in figure 10 according to the following index: (releases per month/10); this index is essential to 
control for crucial cyclical movie releases on both standard candidates. Secondly, this method is applied to assure that each released movie is included 
in our analysis without giving their sum an unreasonable weight against other events. Other types of events (see Appendix A) are excluded from figure 
10. 
Kind of events Scores for BD or HD-DVD Scores for hybrid 
(thus in favor of both standard candidates or a 
common standard instead) 
Backing exclusively 2 - 
Backing 1 - 
Claiming victory 1 - 
Presentation at trade fairs (not both standard candidates), or 
announcements of basic specifications (not proposals only) 
0,5 - 
Backing both (by products) 0,5/0,5 - 
Backing both (commitment) - 2 
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Notes 
                                                            
1 We provide an in depth case of a specific standard war (Blu-ray against HD-DVD) and thus 
do not take other emerging standard candidates into account (e.g., Taiwan’s Forward 
Versatile Disc, China’s Enhanced Versatile Disc, Japan’s Holographic Versatile Disc, or 
upcoming download format standards). 
2 “In the first stage, firms choose whether to affiliate with other firms so as to share a 
technical standard (platform). The result of the first stage game is a partition of the set of 
firms into associations (coalitions), where the same technical standard prevails within each 
coalition, and different standards prevail across coalitions. ... Each firm can only choose one 
such platform.” (Economides and Skrzypacz, 2003, pp. 2-4). 
3 BETAII: more than one hour play time. 
4 Dynamic capabilities can be taken for “abilities to”, more precisely, as “identifiable 
processes” or “second order capabilities constituted of strategically important core 
capabilities which in turn are comprised of functional capabilities” (Menon, 2008, p. 25). They 
are “fungible” and they represent, particularly “routines”. Core processes, upon which 
dynamic capabilities are based, particularly concern learning, competence & resources-
reconfiguration, but also the coordination and integration of resources into the organization. 
5 AACS is a copy protection layer which is supported and developed by a consortium that 
includes Disney, Microsoft, Matsushita (Panasonic), Warner Bros., IBM, Toshiba and Sony. 
Thus AACS Licensing Administrator consortium consists of several companies of BLURAY 
and HD-DVD adherents. 
6 The first generations of BD blockbuster releases were compatible with almost all players 
around the world. 
7 Ritek says that its multi-layer extension process can be applied to both HD DVD and Blu-
ray formats. At base specifications, 10 layers on an HD DVD would yield 150GB, assuming 
15GB per layer. For Blu-ray, the total over 10 layers jumps to 250GB, assuming the base 
25GB per layer. 
8 Data source: Famitsu: As for 2008 domestic game market scale approximately 
582,610,000,000 Yen, Jan 5, 2009 
(http://www.famitsu.com/game/news/1221045_1124.html, Enterbrain Inc., translated from 
Japanese to English by http://babelfish.yahoo.com/, Yahoo Inc.). 
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